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ABSTRACT:  LeDoux’s (1996) pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a 
crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key 
part in Griffiths’s (1997) argument for why emotions don’t form a natural kind. Likewise, it 
is employed by Faucher and Tappolet (2002) to defend pro-emotion views, which claim 
that emotions aid reasoning (de Sousa 1987, Damasio 1994). LeDoux, however, now argues 
that his work has been misread (2012, 2016, 2017, 2019).  He argues that using emotion 
terms, like ‘fear’, to describe neuro-cognitive data adds a “surplus meaning”: it attributes 
phenomenal properties to survival circuits which they don’t possess. This paper aims to 
explore LeDoux’s new proposal,  and examine the potentially devastating consequences 
that ensue for the aforementioned views. I end by addressing the worry that these lessons 
are conditional on LeDoux’s own higher-order theory of emotional consciousness being 
true.
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1. Introduction 
Neuro-cognitive  data  concerning  the  way  the  brain  processes  and  responds  to  threat, 
especially  LeDoux’s  pioneering  work  outlined  in  The  Emotional  Brain:  The  Mysterious 
Underpinnings of Emotional Life (1996), has played a crucial role in informing debates in the 
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philosophy of emotion. Much of the philosophical draw here centres on what this data 
tells us about the neurobiology of emotion, especially how the brain generates fear. 
LeDoux’s work has proved relevant because he is often credited with discovering 
that the amygdala is the “source” of fear. Two clarifications. First, as I understand it, this 
claim is not intended to convey that the amygdala is merely one of the causal factors that 
contribute to fear. Rather, the claim is something more substantial, i.e. the amygdala is the 
central underlying causal mechanism responsible for fear. Second understood this way, the 
claim should not be taken literally. As LeDoux (2016) clarifies, brain functions are to do 
with brain systems, involving neural circuits, not brain areas. (The talk of brain areas is a 
hangover from the time when we could only study brain functions based on the effects of 
brain lesions in specific areas). So claims about the “source" of fear are best understood as 
claims  about  the  neural  circuitry  that  generate  fear.  Thus  understood,  current  neuro-
cognitive  data,  including  that  of  LeDoux,  is  said  to  provide  us  with  good  empirical 
grounds to suppose that the neural circuitry that generate fear concern subcortical regions 
of the brain, especially the amygdala. 
Another feature of relevance concerns the different ways in which the brain generates 
fear.  Here LeDoux’s work is understood to have demonstrated that there are in fact two 
distinct neural circuits involved in generating fear responses: (i) a thalamus-to-amygdala 
circuit, which bypasses the cortex, is ‘quick and dirty’, and occurs without the conscious 
experience  of  the  stimulus,  and (ii)  a  thalamus-to-cortex-to-amygdala  circuit,  which  is 
slow, and occurs with the conscious experience of the stimulus. These interpretations of 
LeDoux’s findings, and similar interpretations of other neuro-cognitive data concerning 
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the amygdala, have seeped into the philosophical literature, and are employed to further 
various theoretical ends. 
Perhaps this is most evident in the evolutionary developmental approach to emotion 
pioneered by Griffiths (1997). In brief, Griffiths reads the existence of the quick and dirty 
route  to  emotion-generation  as  evidence  for  what  the  psychologist  Tomkins  (1962) 
described as “affect programs”: roughly, an innate neural circuitry, passed down from our 
ancestors, possibly having certain mechanisms in common with some other animals, and 
which are responsible for our emotional responses.  Drawing on the work of Ekman (1972, 1
1973, 1980), Griffiths uses this notion of affect programs to argue both for the existence of 
basic emotions and against the idea that the things picked out by our vernacular category 
of emotion form a natural kind. Very roughly, basic emotions are those generated by affect 
programs, and ‘emotions’ don’t refer to a natural kind for it picks out cognitively complex 
emotions and certain kinds of social pretences, as well as the basic emotions generated by 
the affect programs.2
LeDoux’s work has also found a new lease on life in recent arguments for the pro-
emotion thesis: the view that emotions aid practical reasoning. There are a series of distinct 
views which fall  under the pro-emotion umbrella,  but most share the assumption that 
emotions aid reasoning by modulating attention. The original proponents of this view, e.g. 
de Sousa (1987) and Damasio (1994), argue that emotions help with decision-making by 
 In earlier work, Griffiths (1997) relies on various neuro-cognitive data on threat circuitry but 1
doesn’t cite LeDoux, whereas he makes explicit reference to LeDoux (1996) in subsequent work, 
e.g. see Griffiths (2002, 2004a).
  For  Griffiths,  complex  emotions,  roughly,  are  those  that  involve  responding  in  “a  more 2
cognitively complex way to more highly analyzed information” (2002: 394).
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drawing our attention to some response-options over others. This hypothesis has well-
known  problems,  a  major  one  being  that  it  arguably  doesn’t  stand  up  to  empirical 
scrutiny.  Similar,  though  crucially  distinct,  pro-emotion  theses,  however,  have  been 3
proposed, and with empirical backing. In their survey paper, Faucher and Tappolet (2002), 
for instance, point to a series of findings, including LeDoux (1996), to argue that emotions, 
in particular fear and anxiety, modulate our attention of visual stimuli, and do so in ways 
that might aid certain developmental ends. 
The trouble is, such philosophical implications of the neuro-cognitive data possibly 
stem from a misunderstanding. In recent work, LeDoux (2012, 2016, 2017, 2019) argues 
that this data has been misread owing to the way scientists talk about their research. He 
takes his own work as an example:
In retrospect, I now believe that it was a mistake to use the expression “fear system” to 
describe  the  role  of  the  amygdala  in  detecting  and  responding  to  threats,  and  also 
erroneous to talk about fear stimuli and fear responses in this context. (LeDoux 2016: 36)
Crucially, the mistake stems not from new and contradicting empirical findings, but rather 
from the way scientists  talk  about,  and sometimes conceptualise,  the  existing data.  In 
particular, it stems from using mental state terms to describe the function of brain circuits, 
which  in  turn  inflicts  the  data  with  a  “surplus  meaning”:  roughly,  the  attribution  of 
 The majority of critiques focus on Damasio, e.g. see Evans (2002), Dunn, Dalgleish, and Lawrence 3
(2006), Gerrans (2007), Linquist and Bartol (2013), and Bartol and Linquist (2015). But see Ransom 
(2016) for a challenge directed specially at de Sousa. Also see AUTHOR (XXXX) for a discussion of 
the differences between de Sousa and Damasio’s proposals, as well as a brief response to Ransom.
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psychological  properties  to  these circuits  which they don’t  posses.  With respect  to  the 
neural  circuitry  that  deals  with  threat,  describing  it  as  a  “fear  system”  suggests 
(incorrectly) that it is the same as the circuitry that underly the conscious experience of 
fear. 
Philosophers who typically take conscious experience to be an essential component 
of emotion, then, seem to be committing an error when they rely on LeDoux, and similar 
empirical  research,  to  proffer  their  preferred  theories  of  emotion.  This  paper  aims  to 4
investigate this error. In what follows, I disentangle the neuro-cognitive data which is at 
the  heart  of  LeDoux’s  diagnosis  from the  broader  revisionist  project,  i.e.  of  reframing 
scientific terminology, which he offers as a remedy (§2). I then reapply the lessons from the 
data,  free of the erroneous readings,  to two areas where they have proved crucial:  the 
debate on whether emotions form a natural kind (§3), and pro-emotion views which state 
that emotions aid reasoning by modulating attention (§4). Finally, I end by addressing the 
worry  that  these  lessons  are  conditional  on  LeDoux’s  own  higher-order  theory  of 
emotional consciousness being true (§5).
2. The Surplus Meaning of ‘Fear’
 The  view that  emotional  experience  is  essential  to  emotion  is  the  assumed view in  current 4
philosophy, e.g. see Deonna and Teroni (2012), but is also prevalent amongst scientists, including 
Freud (1915), Clore (1994), Frijda (1999), Russell (2003) and Barret (2009). For a rival view, see Prinz 
(2004).
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LeDoux’s recent work on rethinking the emotional brain can be summed up as follows. 
The use of emotion terms to describe various brain systems attributes to these systems 
psychological properties which they don’t possess; in particular, it attributes to them the 
conscious subjective feelings that typically accompany our emotional responses. Fear is a 
central  example.  Describing  the  defensive  survival  circuitry  which  triggers  our  threat 
responses  as  “fear  circuits”  attributes  to  them,  amongst  other  things,  the  conscious, 
subjective  feelings  of  fear.  This  is  misleading  because,  though  the  survival  circuitry 
influences  our  conscious  feelings  of  fear,  the  circuitry  that  underly  such  feelings  is 
something altogether  distinct.  One way to correct  this  is  to  reserve emotion terms for 
subjective feelings.
Note  that  there  are  four  distinct  claims  being  made  here,  which  are  all  part  of 
LeDoux’s revisionary project: (i) a claim about a misunderstanding in the literature, (ii) the 
related empirical claim about what justifies this reading, (iii) a diagnosis of what causes 
the  misunderstanding,  and  (iv)  a  recommendation  for  how  to  preempt  future 
misunderstanding. Consider the example of fear: 
The vernacular meaning of emotion words is simply too strong. When we hear the word 
‘fear’, the default interpretation is the conscious experience of being in danger, and this 
meaning dominates. For example, although I consistently emphasized that the amygdala 
circuits operate nonconsciously, I was often described in both lay and scientific contexts as 
having shown how feelings of fear emerge from the amygdala. Even researchers working in 
the objective tradition sometimes appear confused about what they mean by fear. (LeDoux 
2017: 303)
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The neurobiological  account  of  how the brain processes  threat,  as  outlined in LeDoux 
(1996)  and  elsewhere,  concerns  how  certain  defensive  survival  circuits  in  the  brain 
respond to threatening stimuli. (i*) This account is read by philosophers and many in the 
scientific community as an account concerning the emotion fear, where ‘fear’ picks out, 
amongst  other  things,  the  conscious  feeling  of  fear.  (ii*)  This  reading,  however,  is 
problematic because although the threat circuitry modulates the kinds of fearful feelings 
we experience, actual conscious experiences of fear are caused by a distinct neural system. 
For example, the cortical circuits,  which give rise to the subjective feelings of emotion, 
need not always be activated when the threat circuitry triggers its defensive responses. 
(iii*) The misreading stems from the way LeDoux, as well as others, describe the threat 
circuity: employing terminology like the “fear system” inflicts the neuro-cognitive data 
with  a  surplus  meaning,  i.e.  we  treat  the  system  not  just  as  that  which  triggers  our 
defensive  responses  but  also  the  subjective  feeling  of  fear.  (iv*)  A way  to  avoid  this 
confusion is to reserve the term ‘fear’ for the conscious feeling of fear. 
LeDoux  (2012,  2016)  is  at  pains  to  note  that  this  revisionist  project  aims  not  to 
redefine or explain emotions but to provide a way to move forward in a scientific study of 
our  survival  circuitry  without  incurring  the  aforementioned  kinds  of  confusion. 
Nevertheless, in future work, he also appears to endorse a stronger position: “subjective 
emotional experience, the feeling, is the essence of an emotion” (LeDoux and Hoffman 
2018: 67). The former is a pragmatic position about scientific practice, whereas the latter, 
intended  or  not,  amounts  to  a  substantive  metaphysical  hypothesis.  Both  claims  are 
important  and  worthy  of  attention  but  will  be  kept  aside,  as  the  the  philosophical 
implications which we will be concerned with in this paper can be brought out by simply 
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focussing  on  claims  (i),  (ii)  and  (iii).  The  philosophical  confusions  that  result  from 
misreading the empirical data are best seen by example, which will be the topic of the next 
two sections, but for the remainder of this section, let me say a bit more about the data 
itself and how it has been misread.
In  very  simple  terms,  the  data  is  misread  because  it  doesn’t  speak  to  emotional 
experience while it is interpreted as doing just this. Now, there are well-known reasons 
why we think that third-person scientific methodology cannot give us direct access to first-
person introspectable conscious experience.  The problem that concerns us is not anything 5
near as  grand.  The problem for  us isn’t  that  we cannot  directly read off  claims about 
emotional  experience from neuro-cognitive  data,  but  that  the  specific  data  in  question 
doesn’t give us anything resembling even a third-person science of emotional experience. 
To  elaborate,  LeDoux  accepts  that  verbal  reports  give  us  adequate  means  to  study 
conscious experience:  “the hallmark of  conscious states  in humans is  that  they can be 
reported” (2016: 149). The problem is that the neural circuitry that underly our emotional 
responses are distinct from those responsible for our emotions experiences, which we can 
measure by verbal reports. 
In the case of fear, this problem isn’t really new. As LeDoux (2016) notes, the scientific 
press,  e.g.  Nature,  Science,  Wired,  Scientific  American  and Discover,  have all  recently run 
stories which counter what they suppose to be orthodoxy, viz. that the amygdala is the 
source of fear — where ‘fear’ is intended to mean the feeling of fear. Based on findings by 
Feinstein  et  al  (2013),  fear,  they  report,  can  be  experienced by  a  subject  with  bilateral 
amygdala damage. These reports, however, only have the shock-value they do on the basis 
 See Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1995).5
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of the surplus reading; when we suppose that the survival circuits that underly our threat 
responses,  and for which the amygdala plays a key role,  are also what constitutes the 
feeling of fear. What LeDoux is at pains to convey is that what these reports assume to be 
orthodoxy itself rests on a misunderstanding. 
The surplus reading of the old empirical literature is mistaken because the survival 
circuits  that  trigger  our  defensive responses  come apart  from the neural  circuitry  that 
underly  the  conscious  feeling  of  fear.  The  new findings,  e.g.  by  Feinstein  et  al  (2013), 
strengthens, rather than undermines, this. For LeDoux (2017), the main reason to suppose 
that these circuitries come apart has to do with the fact that it accounts for a whole host of 
puzzles in the field:
1) The  feelings  of  fear  don’t  correlate  well  with  measures  of  behavioural  and 
physiological defence responses.6
2) Patients  with  damage  to  the  amygdala  don’t  manifest  the  physiological  defence 
responses but still feel fear.7
3) Threats processed unconsciously still  trigger the amygdala and activate the defence 
responses even when the subject lacks the feeling of fear.8
4) The feeling of fear is not tied to a single subcortical circuit.9
 LeDoux (2016), LeDoux and Brown (2017), and LeDoux and Hoffman (2018).6
 See Feinstein et al (2013) but also Anderson and Phelps (2002) for a discussion of the relationship 7
between the amygdala and subjective experiences more broadly.
 Ohman (2002), Tamietto and Gelder (2010), and Bornemann et al (2012).8
 LeDoux (2016, 2019), and LeDoux and Brown (2017).9
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5) Drug discovery based on the defence responses of animals comes up with medications 
that are more likely to alter behavioural tendencies than the feelings of fear.10
These findings undercut the presupposition that the amygdala, and survival circuits more 
broadly, are the main source of the conscious feeling of fear. One further point to note is 
that they do so without the need to assume a positive theory of what in fact underlies the 
conscious experience of  fear.  As we shall  see in the final section,  LeDoux does offer a 
positive account of emotional consciousness, which strengthens the existing reasons for a 
separation  between  survival  circuits  and  those  which  underly  the  feelings  of  fear. 
Nevertheless, the proceeding philosophical implications of LeDoux’s recent work can be 
drawn  out  without  the  need  to  buy  into  his  more  controversial  views  concerning 
emotional consciousness.
3. The Natural Kind Debate
In  his  seminal  book,  What  Emotions  Really  Are:  The  Problem  of  Psychological  Categories, 
Griffiths  (1997)  argues  that  emotions  don’t  form  a  natural  kind.  As  Griffiths  (2002) 
explains, this matters because philosophers of emotion often take as their aims the genesis, 
development and consequences of a ‘typical’ emotion. If emotions don’t form a natural 
kind, these projects are doomed from the onset for there won’t be any such thing as a 
typical emotion. 
 See LeDoux and Pine (2016), Pine and LeDoux (2017), and Fanselow and Pennington (2018) for a 10
critique.
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Griffiths’s argument for this controversial position is broken into two parts. In the 
first part, he develops a “psychoevolutionary” approach to emotion, and in the second he 
provides an exposition of the notion of natural kinds at play in the natural sciences. Let us 
take each in turn. 
In part one, Griffiths puts more meat on the bones of the the psychoevolutionary 
approach  to  emotion  he  develops  earlier  (1990),  which  he  takes  to  be  Darwinian  in 
conception. Here, and in future work, he draws on Darwin (1859, 1872), but more so on the 
Darwin-inspired work on the facial  expression of emotion developed by Ekman (1972, 
1973, 1980), to defend the existence of Tomkin’s affect programs: “short-term, stereotypical 
responses  involving  facial  expression,  autonomic  nervous  system  arousal,  and  other 
elements. The same patterns of response occur in all cultures and homologues are found in 
related species” (Griffiths 1997: 8). Griffiths, following Ekman, sometimes refers to these 
responses as ‘basic emotions’, and following Ekman’s list,  takes them to include anger, 
fear, happiness, sadness, surprise and disgust.11
While Tomkins regarded affect programs as being hypothetical, Griffiths, along with 
Ekman, endorses a realist position which rests on an argument from abduction. In brief, 
affect  program  responses  possess  certain  characteristics:  they  are  both  complex  and 
coordinated,  occur  very  quickly  after  the  stimulus  is  registered,  and  are  typically 
involuntary.  These  features  can be  best  explained by the  existence  of  “a  single  neural 
program  that  is  triggered  by  the  stimulus  and  controls  the  various  elements  of  the 
 Ekman’s (1999) updated list includes 16 basic emotions.11
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unfolding response” (pg. 84). In subsequent work (2004a), Griffiths cites LeDoux (1996) in 
support for there being a neural basis for the affect programs concerning fear.12
The other significant development in part one concerns the contrast between basic 
emotions and other kinds of responses that fall under the vernacular category of emotion. 
These  include  more  cognitively-involving  emotions  or  what  he  laters  calls  “complex 
emotions” (2002), e.g. jealousy, and various forms of social pretences, like love. Crucially, 
Griffiths argues that these kinds of responses don’t share enough similarities to be unified 
under one emotion banner. For example, whilst the affect program responses may affect 
complex  emotions,  these  two  kinds  of  responses  come  apart:  affect  programs  can  be 
triggered sans the complex emotions, and vice versa. The affect programs, ergo, can’t be said 
to underly all of the kinds of things picked out by our ordinary emotion terms.
In part two, Griffiths develops what he takes to be the notion of natural kinds at play 
in the natural sciences: kinds which are useful for explanation and induction. This notion 
of natural kinds is distinct from that employed in metaphysics, i.e.  the kinds of things 
which ‘carve nature at its joints’. Instead, drawing on Goodman (1954) and Boyd (1991), 
Griffiths  endorses  a  “theory  view”  of  kind  terms,  the  basic  idea  being  that  our 
categorisation  of  things  into  kinds  aims  to  locate  “projectable  properties”,  roughly  a 
 Or  more  accurately,  Griffiths  takes  LeDoux  (1996)  to  have  confirmed  a  twin-pathway 12
neurobiological account of fear, where the first pathway lends support for the existence of affect 
programs concerning fear.
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“cluster of  correlated properties and that we can offer some defeasible justification for 
extrapolating those correlations” (Griffiths 2004b: 906).13
Natural kinds in this sense are supposed to be domain specific. A natural kind in 
nosology, for example, might not offer the kinds of property clusters that would allow for 
induction and explanation in  physics.  That  said,  much of  Griffiths’s  discussion of  the 
natural  kinds  that  should  be  at  play  in  psychology,  and  thereby  of  relevance  for  an 
investigation into emotion, is informed by the notion in evolutionary biology.
To elaborate, according to Griffiths, “the purpose of categorization in the sciences is 
to group together things which resemble one another in many different ways because of 
some underlying, similarity-generating mechanism” (1997: 16). It is the existence of such 
shared  underlying  mechanisms  that  offer  (defeasible)  justification  for  extrapolation. 
Moreover,  a possible way to facilitate research into these underlying mechanisms is to 
categorise things using the notion of evolutionary homology (shared ancestry) in contrast 
to analogy (shared function). In more detail:
A homologue is “The same organ in different animals under every variety of form and 
function.”  (Owen,  1843:  374),  a  definition  interpreted since  Darwin to  mean that  these 
organs  are  descended  from  a  common  ancestral  form.  Analogies  are  cases  where  two 
unrelated structures resemble one another because natural selection has adapted them for 
the same ecological role. (Griffiths 2002: 396)
 In later work, Griffiths (2004b) opts to use Brigandt’s (2003) term ‘investigative kinds’ in order to 13
distance his account from other notions of natural kinds. See Hacking (2007) for an overview of the 
various conceptions of natural kinds. 
13
For  example,  the  wings  of  a  fruit  bat  are  analogous  to  those  of  a  pigeon,  as  the 
resemblances between them are a product of being adapted for the same ecological role, 
viz. work amongst branches. However, these wings aren’t homologous with each other 
because they don’t result from the same ancestral form. What is important to note here is 
that  contra  classifications  based analogy,  those  based on homology are  ‘deep’.  Despite 
superficial  differences,  even  when  the  function  has  been  transformed,  there  is  more 
convergence in the underlying mechanisms. For this reason, Griffiths argues that natural 
kinds  should be  classified on the  basis  of  homology not  analogy,  for  only  the  former 
provide us with resemblances of an underlying (causal) mechanism which is crucial for 
scientific  explanation and induction.  This  holds  true  for  natural  kinds  in  evolutionary 
biology,  but  also  for  such  kinds  in  psychology,  and  thereby  informs  the 
psychoevolutionary approach to emotion spelt out earlier.
On  the  basis  of  parts  one  and  two,  Griffiths  goes  on  to  argue  that  only  affect 
programs should count as natural kinds, as only they can be grouped together on the basis 
of having homologous traits. Moreover, since the other things referred to as ‘emotion’ can’t 
be grouped together on the basis of homology, nor have a shared basis in basic emotions 
which do have such a basis, emotions, i.e. as a whole, don’t form a natural kind. That is, 
while some emotion types, e.g. ‘fear’, might form natural kinds, the category ‘emotion' 
doesn’t. There is, it turns out, no such thing as a typical emotion.  14
 Griffiths’s final conclusion is stronger:  he runs together the idea that emotions don’t form a 14
natural  kind  with  the  claim  that  the  category  of  emotion  should  be  eliminated.  As  several 
commentators  have observed,  eliminativism is  a  far  more  controversial  position,  which is  not 
entailed by his overall argument, e.g. see Solomon (1999). I turn to this issue at the end of the 
section.
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How  much  this  should  prove  a  threat  to  a  philosophy  of  emotion  depends  on 
whether it shares the same subject-matter as the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion. 
It  is  at  this  very  juncture  that  the  surplus  meaning  of  emotion  terms  threatens  the 
discourse. Philosophers, as we noted, tend to view the subjective experience of an emotion 
as  being  either  the  essence  or  an  essential  component  of  an  emotion.  Lessons  from 
Griffiths’s  extended Darwinian  approach  to  emotion,  then,  need only  take  hold  if  his 
account speaks to this concern. All philosophical responses to Griffiths, as far as I can tell, 
assume that it does.  Nevertheless, the textual evidence for this is shaky at best. 15
Part of the problem is that the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion neglects the 
phenomenology of  emotion.  The  other  is  that  when Griffiths  does  mention  emotional 
experience within the context of this approach, his position isn’t entirely consistent:
i) Emotion feelings and cognitive phenomena such as the directing of attention are obvious 
candidates to be added to this list [of affect program responses]. (Griffiths 1997: 77)
ii) The output  of  perceptual  systems is  a  mental  event,  a  perception,  whereas  that  of  the 
emotion system is behavioral. (Griffiths 1997: 94)
iii) The affect program theory can (and should) incorporate emotional feelings either as an 
additional element of the program or as the perception of the physiological elements of the 
program. (Griffiths 1997: 121)
Griffiths (1997), then, seems to be wavering between three distinction positions on how 
emotional feelings stand with respect to the coordinated set of changes that constitute the 
 See Deonna and Teroni (2012: §2) for a sample.  15
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affect  program responses.  Roughly,  these feelings are (i)  relevant,  (ii)  irrelevant  or  (iii) 
essential features of our affect program responses. At face value, the lesson is that Griffiths 
doesn’t  hold a consistent  view on emotional  feelings vis-a-vis  affect  programs.  A more 
charitable reading has it that emotional feelings aren’t the primary explanatory targets of 
the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion, which seeks to draw on neuroscience and 
evolutionary  biology  to  offer  a  psychological  science  of  the  emotions.  Insofar  as  the 
sciences  are  in  the  business  of  studying  third-person  accessible  physiological  and 
behavioural  responses,  as  opposed  to  first-person  accessible  phenomenally  conscious 
experiences, the neglect is understandable. Nevertheless, it does little address the present 
concern, i.e. whether Griffiths’s position should inform a philosophy of emotion. 
The reason to suppose that it does stems from the assumption made by Griffiths that 
these  physiological  and  behavioural  responses  coincide  with  the  phenomenology  of 
emotion.  This  is  evident  from the  third position,  but  also  from the  way he  draws on 
Ekman to develop his account of affect programs: 
The psychoevolutionary theory describes a set of well-defined physiological responses that 
can  be  used  to  create  a  new classification  of  emotional  responses.  Ekman and  his  co-
workers call the responses they have isolated fear, anger, joy, surprise, disgust and sadness. 
They use these traditional  labels  because the new categories coincide more or less well  with the 
occurrent, phenomenologically salient instances of these traditional categories. I shall refer to these 
six categories as the affect-program responses. (Griffiths 1990: 189, my italics)
Both Ekman and Griffiths assume that the physiological responses that are a part of the 
affect  programs  coincide  with  emotional  feelings.  On  this  assumption,  empirical 
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discoveries  about  affect  programs  do  have  implications  for  a  philosophy  of  emotion. 
However, whether the assumption itself is justified is a different matter.
One important  lesson from LeDoux’s  recent  work is  that  this  assumption is  now 
found to be incorrect. The threat circuitry, which concerns the amygdala and is responsible 
for the affect program responses, comes apart from the subjective experiences of emotion. 
Though  the  neural  circuitry  that  trigger  these  responses  can  affect  our  subjective 
experiences  and  alter  them  in  various  ways,  the  conscious  experience  of  emotion  is 
grounded  in  a  different  neural  circuitry.  The  upshot  is  that  discoveries  about  affect 
programs don’t generalise to emotional feelings.
The point  can also be made in another way.  It  is  plausible that  both Ekman and 
Griffiths, in their discussion of affect programs, take ‘fear’ to refer to a property cluster, 
which  includes  the  conscious  experience  of  fear,  as  well  as  our  defensive  responses 
generated  by  the  survival  circuits.  Nevertheless,  as  mentioned  earlier,  Griffiths  also 
assumes ‘fear’,  like other kind categories,  can only be categorised using such property 
clusters if  the properties in question co-occur due to an underlying causal mechanism. 
(Recall,  the  purpose  of  categorisation  is  to  allow  extrapolation  from  observed  to 
unobserved instances, which is justified only if the properties co-occur due to such shared 
mechanisms).  It  is  precisely  this  assumption  which  is  now  shown  to  be  false.  While 
phenomenological and physiological properties associated with fear do typically co-occur, 
they result from distinct causal mechanisms, which in turn means that we can no longer 
group things together as ‘fear’ on the basis of such property clusters. As a result, we can 
no longer justifiably suppose that discoveries about the affect programs that control our 
defensive responses hold for the conscious experience of fear as well. 
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On either way of making the point, Griffiths’s discussion of affect programs is subject 
to  a  surplus  meaning.  In  using  emotion  terms  to  describe  these  responses,  e.g.  ‘basic 
emotions’, the affect program responses are read as having psychological properties they 
don’t have, viz. the conscious experience of emotion.  Philosophers have engaged with 16
Griffiths on the basis of this surplus meaning. However, if the neuro-cognitive data on 
offer by LeDoux is on the right track, this surplus meaning is also seen to be unfounded. 
There are at least two lessons to draw from this. First, and perhaps most pressingly, 
what  Griffiths  takes  be  the  contender  for  a  natural  kind,  and  worthy  of  a  science  of 
emotion,  i.e.  affect  programs,  is  something that  is  only  indirectly  related to  emotional 
experience. So philosophers who take such experience to be essential to emotion shouldn’t 
look to the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion to underpin their metaphysics. This 
lesson should be both surprising and alarming, as it tells us that more than twenty years of 
philosophical discussion generated by Griffiths’s influential work, What Emotions Really 
Are, is off the mark.
This  is  not  to  say  that  philosophers  have  nothing  to  learn  from  the 
psychoevolutionary  approach.  Here  is  the  second  lesson.  Griffiths’s  argument  for  the 
category ‘emotion’ not forming a natural  kind centres on there being distinct  kinds of 
emotion types; some that involve affect programs and others which don’t. He argues that 
only some emotion types, i.e. those constituted by affect program responses, form natural 
kinds. However, we can now make the case against any given type of emotion being a 
natural kind — including basic emotion types. Take fear. It is plausible that the vernacular 
 Scarantino's  (2018)  defence  of  basic  emotions  qua  affect  programs  takes  the  lessons  from 16
LeDoux’s recent work into account by forgoing the need for such emotions to have phenomenal 
properties.  
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category of fear picks out various affect program responses, as well the conscious feelings 
of being afraid. Since the mechanisms that underly these two kinds of phenomena come 
apart,  there  is  no guarantee  that  all  things  picked out  by the  term ‘fear’  will  share  a 
mechanism which offers justification for extrapolation. The upshot is that though affect 
programs  concerning  fear  still  plausibly  form  a  natural  kind,  we  can  no  longer 
unequivocally say that fear itself is a natural kind. 
Perhaps this is more grist to Griffiths’s mill. Despite arguing that basic emotions are 
natural kinds, Griffiths (1997) claims that a future psychological science should ultimately 
get  rid of  the category ‘emotion’.   (The category creates confusion because it  refers  to 
things which are natural kinds, as well  as things which aren’t).  If  no emotions form a 
natural kind, not even basic emotions, then such a position is indeed warranted. We may 
have  a  science  of  affect  programs,  but  we  can  no  longer  have  a  science  of  emotion. 
Nevertheless, it is also hard not to see this as a reductio of Griffiths’s whole approach. 
Though Griffiths thinks that a future science can make do without the vernacular category 
of emotion, he does think that there is something picked out by this category, which forms 
a natural kind and is worthy of a science of emotion, viz. basic emotions. It  is for this 
reason that the psychoevolutionary approach is an approach to emotion. However, if even 
basic emotion types don’t form a natural kind, the link between the approach and what it 
claims to investigate is severed. We can have a science of affect programs, which we do 
already, but this can no longer provide an empirical basis for a psychology of emotion. If 
we want a scientifically robust approach to emotion itself, this must be found elsewhere.
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4. The Pro-Emotion Debate
According  to  Jones  (2006),  a  new  consensus  is  emerging  from  both  philosophy  and 
psychology, which replaces the old dogma that emotions (only) hinder reasoning for the 
thesis that they, as a matter of fact, can aid practical reasoning. On this rival view, emotions 
are said to be “clever design solutions to the problem of making fast decision in response 
to practical problems posed by the natural and social worlds: we perceive a danger and 
fear  immediately  primes  us  to  take  protective  action”  (Jones  2006:  3).  Precisely  how 
emotions  aid  decision-making  is  hypothesised  by  both  de  Sousa  (1987)  and  Damasio 
(1994),  which  has  to  do  with  how  emotions  modulate  attention.  On  both  accounts, 
emotions  help  us  make  decisions  promptly  by  highlighting  some options  as  relevant, 
whilst eliminating others from consideration. Emotions, on these accounts, aren’t the sole 
drivers  of  what  to  choose,  but  rather  narrow the  scope of  what  is  considered by our 
rational faculties. In Damasio’s words, emotions act as “biasing devices” which bias us in 
favour of some options at the expense of others (pg. 174). 
The claim that emotions aid decision-making, especially in the specific ways spelt out 
by de Sousa and Damasio, arguably, doesn’t hold up to empirical scrutiny.  Nevertheless, 17
there appears to be something right in the idea that emotions meet certain evolutionary 
ends by modulating attention. In their survey article, Faucher and Tappolet (2002) review 
the  empirical  data,  from  both  psychology  and  neuroscience,  in  support  of  this  idea. 
 One major criticism is that the original hypotheses are vague, and none of their disambiguations 17
are plausible in light of either the cited or new empirical data, e.g. see Evans (2002), Gerrans (2007), 
Colombetti (2008), Bartol and Linquist (2015), and Ransom (2016).
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Though  they  take  their  survey  to  lend  support  for  de  Sousa’s  hypothesis,  they 
acknowledge that the data considered underdetermines his thesis in certain respects:
de Sousa claims that the emotions’ function is to direct our attention. More precisely, he 
suggests that emotions determine a) what information is processed, b) what inferences are 
drawn, and c) what options are considered in deliberation. The data we have considered 
concern only the first part of this tripartite thesis. (Faucher and Tappolet 2002: 127)
It is my view that Faucher and Tappolet discuss an even more restricted thesis than is let 
on by this qualification. While de Sousa, as well as Damasio, hypothesise that emotions aid 
decision-making  by  helping  us  choose  which  course  of  action  to  take,  the  hypothesis 
considered in the survey holds that emotions, in particular fear and anxiety, direct our 
attention  to  certain  visual  stimuli.  For  several  reasons,  this  is  a  much  more  modest 
hypothesis than that originally ascribed to pro-emotion views. First, nowhere is there a 
claim about emotions actually aiding practical rationality. Rather, the hypothesis explored, 
i.e. that emotions modulate attention, if true, points in favour of a possible route by which 
emotions  might  aid  reasoning.  Second,  it  is  not  that  emotions  modulate  attention 
wholesale, but rather particular kinds of negative emotions do, namely fear and anxiety. 
Third, the effects of emotion on attention are restricted to the domain of visual stimuli. 
These considerations suggest a much more restricted hypothesis than those typically on 
offer by pro-emotion camps. Nevertheless, this more restricted thesis, though it doesn’t 
quite establish a pro-emotion thesis, let alone a consensus, can be cited in support of it, 
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and  crucially,  isn’t  undermined  by  sceptical  challenges  to  the  original  pro-emotion 
positions. 
My cause for contention here isn’t with the empirical data, nor in the way it is used to 
support the more restricted thesis. Rather, it concerns how we are to interpret the restricted 
thesis itself, especially in relation to de Sousa’s pro-emotion thesis. The worry is that this is 
precisely an instance where the surplus meaning of ‘fear’ threatens to muddy the waters of 
what can be concluded on the basis of empirical data. In brief, the restricted thesis holds 
that fear and anxiety modulate our attention of visual stimuli. The neuro-cognitive data 
cited  in  favour  of  this  thesis  concern  the  effects  of  threat  circuitry  on  attentional 
phenomena, which suggests that we should interpret ‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’ in the thesis as 
the  physiological  responses  associated  with  these  emotion  labels.  However,  the  pro-
emotion thesis owing to de Sousa seems to be one about how emotional experiences aid 
practical reasoning. The only way we can read the neuro-cognitive data as supporting de 
Sousa’s thesis, then, is if we interpret the restricted reading as having a surplus meaning: 
‘fear’ and ‘anxiety’, which modulate attention, refer to the conscious experience of fear 
and anxiety. The upshot is that there is a faulty inference from the neuro-cognitive data to 
de Sousa’s hypothesis, which appears to be a product of the surplus meaning of emotion-
terms used to spell out the restricted thesis.
Let us look at this charge more closely. To start with, de Sousa, I take it, assumes that 
emotions are conscious phenomena. This is not made explicit, but several points carry in 
favour  of  this  interpretation.  First,  this  is  the  way  he  is  usually  interpreted  in  the 
philosophical literature; plausibly owing to the deep-seated nature of the assumption that 
emotions  are,  at  least  typically,  conscious  phenomena.  (Given  the  prevalence  of  this 
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assumption, at the very least, we would expect de Sousa to provide us with a caveat if he 
means something else). Second, this is something that appears to be born out of de Sousa’s 
metaphysics.  de Sousa is  typically read as  endorsing a  perceptual  theory of  emotions, 
which holds that emotions are, or somehow are akin to, perceptions, e.g. to fear Fido is to 
perceive danger. Such perceptual theories of emotion tend to be derived on the basis of an 
analogy  between  emotion  and  perpetual  experience.  For  instance,  in  emphasising  the 
importance  of  this  analogy,  Tappolet  notes  that  “emotions  and perceptual  experiences 
share  many  important  features,  such  as  phenomenal  qualities.”  (2016:  xii).  Since 
perceptual theories are derived in this way, it stands to reason that plausible versions have 
emotional experiences as their explanatory target. Third, de Sousa argues for his thesis 
solely on the basis of armchair reasoning, which renders it plausible that he is, at least 
partially,  relying  on  phenomenological  evidence  when  he  describes  emotions  as 
determining the “salience” of response-options. Such evidence can only have emotional 
experiences as the subjects of their explanans.
Now consider the neuro-cognitive data Faucher and Tappolet think lends support for 
de  Sousa’s  hypothesis.  This  includes  several  findings  on  emotional  phenomena, 
attentional phenomena, and the connection between the two. The problem manifests itself 
regarding the first of these findings. Faucher and Tappolet begin their survey on emotions 
by citing LeDoux’s findings which he now describes as being mistaken: “the amygdala has 
been tagged as the hub of the emotion of fear” (LeDouX 1996: 168). This assumption that 
the  amygdala  underlies  fear  is  central  to  their  exploration  of  the  connection  between 
emotion and attention. The implicit reasoning, which results from this assumption, and 
informs  this  part  of  their  survey,  goes  something  like  this:  ‘LeDoux  etc.  show  that 
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amygdala is responsible for fear. Other findings show that amygdala modulates attention. 
Inference: fear modulates attention’. For example, they cite LeDoux in support of the claim 
that “Efferents projections of the amygdala to the cortical structures explain how fear can 
influence cognitive processes” (pg. 125). Such examples scatter their discussion. In fact, 
Faucher and Tappolet make six intermediary conclusions on the basis of their survey of 
the neuro-cognitive data. These conclusions establish various links between the amygdala 
and attention, but the ensuing discussion is carried out as one where ‘fear’ directs our 
attention. 
The inferences drawn here are not problematic in and of themselves. The conclusions 
about fear and its effects on attention are unproblematic so long as we remain clear that by 
‘fear’ here, we mean either the threat circuitry or the physiological responses to which they 
give rise. What’s problematic is when we read ‘fear’ in this context as also involving the 
conscious feeling of fear. This is what makes the inference fallacious. 
The surplus meaning of fear threatens Faucher and Tappolet’s survey at two levels. 
First, it threatens the discussion of the restricted thesis. In discussing the actual empirical 
findings themselves, Faucher and Tappolet are often careful to make qualifications that 
pre-empt the problematic  readings.  For instance,  they note that  “we will  review some 
recent evidence showing that cerebral structures,  traditionally  thought to be part of the 
emotional network, might contribute to attentional function” (p. 123, my italics). Likewise, 
elsewhere  they  make  connections  between  emotional  responses  and  attention  whilst 
staying clear of talking about emotions simpliciter. 
However, confusion still results from how this discussion of the neuro-cognitive data 
is  to  be  viewed  in  the  context  of  their  overall  survey.  Before  considering  the  neuro-
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cognitive  data,  Faucher  and  Tappolet  evaluate  psychological  data  in  favour  of  the 
restricted thesis.  Here  they consider  emotional  stroop tasks,  probe  detection tasks  etc, 
where  it  is  explicit  that  their  target  is  not  emotional  responses,  but  the  conscious 
experience of emotion itself: 
[T]he data we considered suggest strongly the emotion of fear, as experienced by normal 
subjects,  involves  attentional  bias  toward  three  stimuli  of  the  same  kind  observed  in 
pathological cases. (Faucher and Tappolet 2002: 120, my italics)
The psychological data and the neuro-cognitive data, then, seem to be about two distinct 
phenomena, and nowhere is this flagged in their discussion. Consequently, the ensuing 
discussion, which proceeds on the basis of both kinds of data, is confusing for we are left 
without knowing what the “emotional phenomena” are that is supposed to be related to 
attention.
At the second level, the surplus meaning of fear threatens the discussion of how the 
restricted thesis supports de Sousa’s pro-emotion hypothesis.  As noted, de Sousa takes 
emotions to be conscious phenomena,  which means we can only extrapolate  from the 
restricted  thesis  to  a  discussion  of  this  more  general  hypothesis  by  deploying  the 
problematic interpretation of the restricted thesis. This results in not just the threat of a 
surplus meaning, but of the fallacious inference itself: ‘the amygdala underlies our threat 
circuitry, and also modulates attention, therefore, fear modules attention.’ It is hard to see 
how something like this isn’t going on when Faucher and Tappolet draw their survey to a 
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close: “The conclusion is that de Sousa’s hypothesis is on the right track with respect to 
fear and anxiety” (pg. 135).
The aim of this section isn’t to undermine pro-emotion views , or even to offer a 18
critique of de Sousa’s view in particular.  The point was to see how the surplus meaning 19
of ‘fear’ might influence discussions of certain pro-emotion views. That said, one obvious 
lesson to draw is that, contra Faucher and Tappolet, the neuro-cognitive data concerning 
our defensive survival circuitry doesn’t support de Sousa’s hypothesis. Another is that to 
the extent to which such data can be utilised to support pro-emotion views, they can only 
be employed to support views that hold that threat circuitry modulates attention,  and 
thereby  possibly  plays  a  role  in  resolving  various  practical  problems.  We  find  the 
underpinnings of such a view in LeDoux himself. Very roughly, the threat circuitry raises 
our  vigilance,  i.e.  we become more attuned to  our  sensory environment,  focussing on 
present  dangers  and  being  alert  for  future  ones,  whilst  lowering  our  threshold  for 
additional defensive responses (2016: 44-5).  What we can’t do, however, is establish a 20
close link between such neuro-cognitive data and the pro-emotion theses espoused in the 
 Nothing I have said here undermines behavioural data from psychology, which explains some 18
other  ways  “felt”  emotions  can  both  positively  and  negatively  affect  decision-making.  For 
example,  the  Appraisal  Tendency Framework successfully  links  appraisal  processes  specific  to 
certain emotions with different judgement and choice outcomes. See Lerner  et.  al.  (2015) for an 
overview. 
 E.g. it may be the case that the survival circuits modulate emotional experiences, which in turn 19
modulate  attention.  But  here  the  key  part  of  the  pro-emotion  hypothesis  —  that  emotional 
experiences modulate attention — is supported by the behavioural, as opposed to neuro-cognitive, 
data.
 Also see Prinz (204: 202) for a pro-emotion view which explicitly rejects the idea that ‘emotions’ 20
need to be felt to modulate attention in ways that foster survival.
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philosophical literature; views which assume that emotions qua conscious phenomena are 
what modulate attention and thereby aid practical reasoning. This is not to say that such 
views cannot have a basis in neuroscience. One positive lesson is that if we are to insist on 
defending such views, we should shift our focus from the survival circuitry, which concern 
the amygdala, to those that actually underly the subjective feelings of emotion.
5. Neurobiological Theories of Emotional Consciousness
The case made by LeDoux for a separation between the survival circuitry which processes 
and responds to threat and that which constitute the conscious experience of fear is tied to 
his assumptions about the latter. For this reason, there is a worry that the lessons which we 
can draw on the basis of this separation are conditional on  LeDoux’s own account of 
emotional  consciousness being true.  This worry is  made especially acute owing to the 
prima facie viability of rival neurobiological accounts of emotional consciousness. If any of 
these  rival  accounts  prove  correct,  this  threatens  to  undermine  the  philosophical 
implications of LeDoux’s recent work. In this final section, I address this worry.
LeDoux’s  positive  account  of  emotional  consciousness  is  fleshed  out  in  LeDoux 
(2016), and developed further in LeDoux and Brown (2017) and LeDoux (2019). As is made 
clear  by  LeDoux  and  Brown,  while  it  is  traditional  to  view  cognitive  states  of 
consciousness as arising from a different brain system from that which generates conscious 
feelings, on their account both phenomena are grounded in the very same system. For 
example,  on  some  key  traditional  views,  e.g.  Panksepp’s  (1998,  2016),  the  conscious 
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experience of fear is constituted by subcortical regions of the brain. By contrast, on their 
view,  while  these regions can modulate  emotional  feelings by providing nonconscious 
inputs that alter the kinds of feelings we have, the actual conscious feelings themselves are 
constituted by a different system: the cortical regions of the brain that also underly the 
conscious  experience  of  external  stimuli.  This  they  dub  a  neuro-cognitive  account  of 
emotional consciousness, for “a general network of cognitions underlies both cognitive 
and emotional states of consciousness” (pg. 69). Moreover, they draw on this to inform 
their preferred account, i.e their higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.21
According  to  higher-order  theories  of  consciousness  more  broadly,  first-order 
representations, say a perceptual representation of an external stimulus, don’t suffice for 
consciousness. In addition to having a first-order representation, one must also be aware of 
it to have a conscious experience of the external stimulus.  (Note: this not to say that one 22
needs to be aware that one is aware of the first-order representation). This state of being 
aware of the first-order representational state is the higher-order state, which is crucial for 
consciousness.  LeDoux  and  Brown  offer  a  high-order  theory  not  of  consciousness  in 
general,  but of emotional consciousness.  Moreover,  they draw on the aforementioned 23
assumption  about  brain  systems to  explain  how such a  higher-order  theory  might  be 
implemented at the neurobiological level. 
On their account, first-order states e.g. perceptual representations of external stimuli, 
are  associated  with  the  prefrontal  cortex,  whereas  higher-order  states  concern  the 
 See the Global Workspace Theory, e.g. Baars (2005), Dehaene (2014), and Naccache (2018), for a 21
different neuro-cognitive account.
 E.g. see Rosenthal (2005), Carruthers (2005), and Lau and Rosenthal (2011).22
 A general theory is provided in LeDoux (2019).23
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representation of these first-order states by ‘cortically based general networks of cognition’ 
(GNC). More specially, “subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead 
provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals 
in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits” (pg. 1). 
The same is assumed to be true on the higher-order theory of emotional consciousness. 
What differentiates emotional experiences from other kinds of experiences here are the 
inputs that are processed by the cortical areas; not the processing systems themselves.  24
This neuro-cognitive approach to emotional consciousness has at least two plausible 
rivals:  what LeDoux and Hofmann (2018)  call  the “neuro-Darwinian” and the “neuro-
Jamesian” approaches.  For those who subscribe to the former, e.g. Panksepp (1998, 2016), 25
emotional  feelings  arise  from  amygdala-centred  subcortical  circuits,  which  we  have 
inherited  from our  animal  ancestors  and are  highly  preserved amongst  mammals.  By 
contrast, advocates of the latter, e.g. Damasio (1994) and Craig (2009),  assume that such 
feelings  result from activity in the body-sensing circuits in the neocortex (somato-sensory 
and/or insula areas), e.g. those triggered when threat activates the amygdala circuits. In 
more recent work, Damasio has shifted his emphasis from cortical to subcortical body-
sensing  areas  in  the  brainstem.  The  key  difference  between  these  approaches  and 26
LeDoux’s  is  that  they  take  the  traditional  line,  viz.  that  emotional  consciousness  is  a 
product  of  neural  circuits  distinct  from  those  that  underly  other  kinds  of  conscious 
experience. Which of these accounts is correct is an empirical matter. For LeDoux, the fact 
 Also see Brown, Lau and LeDoux (2019) and LeDoux (2019)24
 They also mention a neuro-behaviourist position, which I shall leave aside for it forgoes realism 25
about subjecting feelings for an eliminativist position. 
 E.g. see Damasio et al. (2013) and Damasio and Carvalho (2013).26
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the the neuro-cognitive account does a better job of explaining various puzzles in the field, 
provides  abductive  grounds  to  prefer  it  over  these  rival  accounts.  This  is  often 27
supplemented by other considerations, e.g. against the neuro-Jamesian approach, LeDoux 
and Hofmann note that while the body-sensing subcortical and cortical “circuits clearly 
represent body states, convincing evidence that these representations are the main causes 
of emotional experiences is lacking” (2018: 68).28
Let us now turn to addressing the present worry, i.e. that the lessons we explored in 
the previous sections are conditional on  LeDoux’s own theory of emotional consciousness 
being true. We now see that there are two ways of disambiguating this worry: the lessons 
are conditional on the neuro-cognitive approach, or they are conditional on  the higher-
order theory of emotional consciousness, where the neuro-cognitive approach gives us an 
account of how the theory is implemented at the neurobiological level. However, we don’t 
need to assume either to draw out our lessons. What we require is not a positive thesis 
about the sub-regions of the brain that give rise to conscious feelings, but rather a negative 
thesis  about  which  regions  don’t.  In  particular,  what  we  require  is  a  rejection  of  the 
traditional  line:  that  conscious  feelings  are  constituted  by  subcortical  circuits  which 
include the amygdala. 
Fear is a case in point. The survival circuits that involve the amygdala, and trigger 
our defensive affective program responses, aren’t what constitute the conscious experience 
of fear. Subsequently, while the affect programs may indirectly shape the kinds of fearful 
feelings  we  have,  empirical  findings  concerning  this  circuitry  can’t  directly  inform  a 
 See page 9.27
 See LeDoux (2016: 133-138, 2019: §53, §64-65) for an extended discussion.28
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philosophy of emotion — where we understand emotion to be a conscious phenomenon. 
Likewise, defensive survival circuits, including the activation of the amygdala, plausibly 
play  a  role  in  modulating attention of  threatening stimuli.  Nevertheless,  for  the  same 
reason as before, we can’t take this as a data point to bolster pro-emotion views which 
hold that emotion qua conscious feelings play a role aiding practical reason by drawing 
our attention to salient features of the environment. This is to say nothing of what in fact 
constitutes the conscious experience of emotion. Rather, the lessons from this paper stand 
or  fall  depending  on  how  much  we  should  look  to  the  traditional  neurobiological 
conception of emotional consciousness to inform a philosophy of emotion. LeDoux’s body 
of work, both old and new, strongly suggests that we should look elsewhere.  29
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